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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines market structure, regulation, and market performance of the Dutch electricity retail market
for households since its opening in 2004. Using data containing monthly prices for all products offered in the
Dutch retail electricity markets over the period 2008–2014, we provide quantitative results on the intensity of
retail competition and the benefits to consumers. Regulation of the retail electricity market is relatively intensive
and encompasses structural measures, contractual restrictions, rules on information provision, price surveillance
and market monitoring. In contrast to most other countries, the Dutch regulation includes a kind of price reg-
ulation which is that the regulator surveys all new retail prices before market introduction in order to prevent
too high retail prices. The Dutch retail electricity market has remained relatively concentrated, with retailers
offering an increasing variety of retail products, often using multiple brands. Competition is characterized by
product innovation, especially for green energy, rather than price competition on homogenous products. Gross
retail margins remain relatively high, as is price dispersion across retailers. The market matured, as evidenced by
fewer consumer complaints and higher switching rates.
1. Introduction
In their cross-country monitoring report, European regulators
(ACER/CEER, 2015) conclude that many retail markets remain very
concentrated with aggregate market share for the three largest elec-
tricity retailers of 70% or more.1 Across the board, strong product in-
novation is observed especially regarding contract duration, additional
services and sustainability. Overall, it is said that the transition towards
a competitive and efficient retail market depends on the ability and the
willingness of individual well-informed households to actively search
for and select contracts that best fit their needs (see also Ofgem, 2011a).
Although aggregate market developments are similar across many
markets, idiosyncratic differences in regulation and (initial) market
structure affect market outcomes.
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the evolution of com-
petition in the Dutch retail energy market for household consumers
since its full opening in 2004, and documents the evolution of both
market structure, regulation and market outcomes. During this period,
the regulation of the retail energy market became gradually more in-
tensive. This increased intensity aimed at improving competition by
eliminating market failures. These market failures in particular refer to
the lack of transparency and negative spill-overs of bad experiences
with one retailer (bankruptcy, fraudulent billing, and bad customer
support) on consumers’ faith in the market.
Because of the large number of regulatory changes in the Dutch
market it is unfortunately not possible to empirically test the impact of
those change on market outcomes. Our analysis therefore consists of
two parts. First, we describe the changes in the regulation in the Dutch
retail energy markets, and give a qualitative assessment of the im-
portance of those regulations (Section 3). In the second part of the
paper, (Sections 4 and 5), we provide quantitative results on the in-
tensity of retail competition and the benefits to consumers. We analyse
market structure, product innovation, pricing strategies, gross retail
margins as well as consumer behaviour. The analysis relies mainly on a
dataset collected by the Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM),
containing monthly prices for all products offered in the Dutch retail
electricity markets over the period 2008–2014.
We find that the Dutch retail market remains concentrated, despite
numerous entrants, as entrants remain small and entry has been offset
by (horizontal) mergers. The number of products has increased
strongly, while the gross retail margin decreased slightly. However,
price differences between retailers remain high, and a large fraction of
consumers has never switched. These inactive consumers are the pri-
mary users of variable price products which are the default products of
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retailers. We find that variable price products are significantly more
expensive than other products, which are chosen by active consumers.
These price differences exist in spite of price supervision by the reg-
ulator. This price supervision aims at ensuring reasonable prices for all
products, without distorting the price formation process between
competitive retailers. We analyse the pass-through rate of wholesale to
retail prices with an error-correction model. We find no evidence for
asymmetric price pass-through, however, the pass-through rate is slow.
In general the functioning of the retail market appears to have im-
proved given the strong decline in the number of consumers’ com-
plaints.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 reviews the theoretical and
empirical literature on retail markets, including an overview of ex-
periences with energy retail markets in the UK, US, Norway, New
Zealand and Australia. Section 3 describes the regulation of the Dutch
retail energy market. Data and methodology for the evaluation of the
Dutch experiences are described in Section 4. The results of our analysis
are discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
Since the start of liberalization of energy markets, the need for retail
competition and its potential benefits for consumers have been subject
to debate. Joskow (2000) sees a rather limited role for retail markets in
the energy sector, as many of the traditional roles of retail markets are
irrelevant for energy (after-sales service and convenient delivery re-
garding location and time). He states therefore that competition in re-
tail energy markets is useful mainly for the provision of additional
services (insurance, energy services), but that regulated distribution-
network operators should provide a basic retail product for the delivery
of energy with a price indexed on the wholesale price. In contrast,
Littlechild (2000) argues that the retail market is all about price com-
petition and that downstream competition is a necessary component for
creating competition in the wholesale market.
One of the predominant features of retail market competition is the
large fraction of so-called dormant or passive consumers, i.e. consumers
that have not switched supplier or contract. The prevalence of passive
consumers may be more pronounced in the electricity sector as the
market evolved from a fully regulated market, and many customers
have never consciously chosen for a particular contract, but simply
continued with their incumbent retailer on a default contract. So this
behaviour could be a habit. However, the decision not to switch may be
rational, if they believe the costs for making a choice (search and
transaction costs) exceed the expected benefits of switching. It is im-
portant, however, to recognize that consumers are heterogeneous and
make different assessments of expected costs and benefits of becoming
an active consumer in the retail market. Although some consumers may
have missed some financial benefits by not switching, the non-financial
costs for them might exceed these benefits, making their behaviour
fully rational.
Armstrong (2014) shows that it might be perfectly rational for in-
formed consumers not to invest in becoming informed and remain non-
savvy. He models the strategic decisions of retailers in several search
models when there are two types of consumers: savvy and non-savvy
consumers and analyses the externalities between both groups. Savvy
consumers shop for the best deal in the market, which induces retailers
to lower prices and increase product quality. Non-savvy consumers do
not make the effort to compare offers and search for more information,
which may be a fully rational decision based on their expectations re-
garding costs and benefits of making such efforts. If retailers cannot
distinguish between consumer groups, non-savvy consumers will also
benefit from lower prices and increased product quality. Hence, there
may be positive externalities.2
Many empirical studies raise concerns about the competitive nature
of retail markets, and identify problems that are associated with a lack
of active consumer participation and high retail market concentration.
Wilson and Waddams Price (2010) show that even in a mature and
transparent retail market as Great Britain's, consumers often make
suboptimal choices and switch to more expensive contracts. In an em-
pirical study of or the Norwegian retail market, Von der Fehr and
Hansen (2009) argue that active consumers have benefited from larger
product variety caused by the liberalization, but passive consumers did
not experience real benefits from liberalization. Von der Fehr and
Hansen (2009) show the coexistence of a very competitive market
segment with low mark-ups and active consumers, and a monopolistic
market segment where suppliers may exploit the consumers’ passivity.
The fraction of savvy and non-savvy consumers affect price dis-
persion in a non-monotonic way (Armstrong, 2014). If all consumers
are savvy, all retailers charge the same low price and price dispersion is
non-existent. With a mixture of consumer types, price dispersion exists
as retailers use mixed pricing strategies. In that case, savvy consumers
pay less than non-savvy consumers. At the other extreme, if all con-
sumers are non-savvy, retailers charge the same monopoly price, and
price dispersion disappears again. The impact of the share of savvy
consumers on price dispersion is, therefore, inversely U-shaped. Such a
curve is also found by Stahl (1988) for the relationship between price
dispersion and transparency of the market. In an oligopoly with sym-
metric firms with full transparency, prices are equal because of Ber-
trand competition, while in case of a complete lack transparency, an
oligopoly with symmetric firms turns into monopolies where each firm
charges the same monopoly price. In between these two extremes there
is an inverted U-curve, which is called the Diamond paradox (Diamond,
1971).
In some empirical studies, the decision to become active in energy
retail markets appears to depend on a consumer's trust that there are no
adverse effects of switching retailer. This appeared to be an issue in
New Zealand, where switching was not centrally coordinated (APEC,
2017). To facility switching, a centralized independent complaint au-
thority was created, and education programs for public awareness were
organized. In addition, a “save protection scheme” was introduced to
increase switching rates, which limits the ability of retailers to offer a
lower retention price to a customer that already started the switching
process, until the switch is completed. Another factor that affects
switching rates is the design of default contracts. In several US states,
switching rates are low due to the existence of default service contracts
which incumbent companies have to offer (Littlechild, 2018). Across
states with retail competition, a median of 20% of residential con-
sumers has switched to competitive retailers since the opening of the
market. A significant fraction of those switchers did not switch in-
dividually, but participated in collective bargaining organized by their
municipality. The advantage of the default service obligation is that it
protects non-active consumers, as they basically have to pay a regulated
tariff. A potential drawback is that potential entrants find it hard to
enter the market, especially if the regulated tariff is very low, if there is
no separation of the retail and distribution activities, and when they
have to rely on the incumbent utilities for billing customers, collecting
bills and assuming debt.
The switching rate of customers is also related to the transparency
of the retail market. In Australia, retailers compete by offering per-
centage discount on their own standard tariff, which makes compar-
isons across retailers hard (ACCC, 2018). Some of those (large) dis-
counts are conditional on paying bills on times.
Besides the switching rate of customers, a key measure to assess the
2 However, Armstrong shows this depends crucially on the set-up: savvy
(footnote continued)
consumers may also create a negative (rip-off) externality for non-savvy con-
sumers if higher prices for non-savvy consumers are used to subsidize savvy
consumers.
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efficiency of retail markets, is the pass-through of upstream costs to
downstream prices. In many retail markets, wholesale price increases
are passed on faster to final end-users than decreases, a phenomenon
called rockets and feathers (Peltzman, 2000).3 The literature proposes
several explanations for those effects. If price adjustments are costly
and on average prices increase with inflation, it might be optimal not to
adjust price downwardly. Another explanation refers to adjustment
costs in technology. If capacity constraints exist in the downstream
market, firms in this market do not face competitive pressure to pass on
upstream cost reductions (Borenstein and Shepard, 2002). A third ex-
planation is related to competition and search effects. The search in-
tensity by consumers declines when prices decrease, and as a result
firms face less competitive pressure to pass on cost reductions (Lewis
and Marvel, 2011).4 Empirical evidence for the rockets and feathers
effects was found for the UK and Norwegian retail electricity market by
Ofgem (2011b), von der Fehr and Hansen (2009) and Mirza and
Bergland (2012). Ofgem (2011b) found some evidence that the com-
petitive process is less intense when prices are falling. This conclusion
was to some extent confirmed by CMA (2016), which pointed at the
large share of inactive consumers as explanation for the presence of the
rockets and feather mechanism.5 Mirza and Bergland (2012) show that
faster downward adjustments of prices would have resulted in con-
siderable consumer savings.
In the remainder of this paper we analyse how the competition in
the Dutch retail electricity market has evolved by looking at the price
dispersion, the profits of retailers, the switching rates and the pass-
through rate of retail costs. Before presenting the method and results,
we first describe the evolution of the Dutch retail electricity market
3. Regulation of the Dutch retail electricity market
Before the liberalization of the Dutch retail market, energy con-
sumers were supplied by a regulated, vertically integrated incumbent
with a regional monopoly for electricity distribution and retail. After a
gradual liberalization of the Dutch retail market, which started for large
industrial users in the nineties, followed by a partial opening for green
electricity products in 2001, all consumers were free to choose supplier
in 2004 (Van Damme, 2005). Since 2004, a number of regulatory
measures has been implemented (Table 1).
The Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) regulates the energy
market. It was created in 2013 by the merger of the Competition
Authority NMa (which was responsible for energy regulation and
competition policy until then), the Consumer Authority and the
Telecom and Post regulator (OPTA). Since the merger, the regulation of
energy retail markets is increasingly based on general consumer pro-
tection rules and less on sector-specific legislation. Regulation consists
of four components: 1) structural measures, 2) contract restrictions, 3)
information provision and transparency and 4) monitoring.
The structural measures include licensing requirements for retailers,
full unbundling of distribution services, and the reallocation of tasks
within the energy value chain. A retail licence is a prerequisite for
becoming active in the market, and is granted to firms that are suffi-
ciently solvent and have satisfactory organizational capabilities.6 In
2008, energy-distribution companies were forced by the government to
unbundle ownership of commercial activities, such as generation,
trading and retailing, from network operation. Network operation and
ownership, however, could not be privatized and remained in hands of
local and national governments. Both measures were meant to guar-
antee the independence of infrastructure operators, improve competi-
tion and in particular facilitate decentralized (renewable) energy pro-
duction (Mulder and Shestalova, 2006).
A significant change in the responsibilities of network operators was
the introduction of the so-called “new market model” in 2013, which
made retailers the sole responsible for managing the switching pro-
cesses on behalf of consumers. Retailers also became the single point of
contact for households, who receive a single bill consisting of both re-
tail and distribution charges.7 As a first step towards the introduction of
the new market model, a capacity-based transport tariff was introduced
in 2009. Since a number of years, the metering infrastructure became
the exclusive responsibility of the network operators, while retailers are
responsible for collecting metering data.8 Since 2012, network opera-
tors are obliged to gradually roll-out smart meters, although consumers
can opt-out.
We do not believe that the introduction of smart meters will have an
immediate impact on competition in the Dutch retail market. A few
retailers offer additional services where consumers receive information
about their demand, but no new contract forms have been introduced
yet.9
The second group of regulatory measures consists of restrictions on
contracts offered by the retailers. These restrictions include a maximum
on (1) the penalty that consumers pay in case of early contract breach
as well as (2) the prohibition of automatic renewal of contracts. The
first restriction follows from sector-specific regulation imposed by the
regulator, while the second restriction is based on general consumer
legislation and is also valid for subscriptions to newspapers, insurance
contracts and telecom contracts.
In order to improve market transparency the legislator1011 decided
that each energy retailer should offer a standardized product that is
identical across retailers on all aspects except price. In cooperation with
the industry and consumer organizations, the regulator therefore issued
a model contract (NMa, 2012a). This model contract prescribes the
contract in all its details (product type, general conditions, etc.).
However, this standardized product is hardly sold. Retailers typically
offer the standard product for the same price as the other products they
sell, but those other products have more generous contracting terms in
other dimensions than price. This might be a rational strategy of re-
tailers to avoid price competition, but might also reflect that retailers
are not allowed to use this product for special temporary offers.
A particular element of the Dutch retail market is the “safety net”
regulation, which is laid down in the Dutch Energy Law.12 This reg-
ulation was initially adopted by the Parliament as a transitional
3 The Rockets and Feathers literature is vast. One of its main applications is
the study of gasoline retail prices, a market where products are also rather
homogenous (Borenstein, 1991). Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) and
Eckert (2013) provide surveys.
4 Recent papers endogenize both search intensity and the strategic price
setting by firms. See Yang and Ye (2008), Tappata (2009), and Cabral and
Fishman (2012).
5 CMA (2016) believes “ that the results are indicative of the presence of a
certain degree of asymmetric price response in the domestic retail energy
markets, in that cost reductions have not been fully passed through to prices”
but overall they “attach limited weight” to this conclusion (p. 411).
6 Once a retailer obtains a licence, only light-handed financial monitoring
(footnote continued)
takes place as the regulator has limited legal power to intervene if a retailer
does not meet financial criteria. If a retailer goes bankrupt, its retail licence is
revoked. Supply to its customers is then guaranteed by the network operator,
until customers are transferred to another retailer.
7 Retailers become the single point of contact for customers, do not need to
understand the different roles of the retailer and the distribution company.
8 Before this change, the market for metering was open for competition. Only
one retailer offered a product that included a smart meter. In first 4 years, about
1% of Dutch households installed a smart meter.
9 For the UK market the market segment of pre-paid contracts, might dis-
appear with the introduction of smart meters. In the Netherlands, pre-paid
contracts have been available on the market only in some years.
10 Amendment to the 1998 Electricity Act (Stb, 2011, 203).
11 The introduction of a standardized retail product led in Norway to strong
price competition with homogenous goods and low mark-ups.
12 Articles 95b of the Elektriciteitswet and Article 44 of the Gaswet.
M. Mulder, B. Willems Energy Policy 127 (2019) 228–239
230
measure to protect consumers, until the market is sufficiently compe-
titive (NMa, 2012b), but the regulation is still in place. Four weeks
before offering a new contract to consumers or four weeks before a
price change, retailers are required to submit the contract to the reg-
ulator, which will check whether the contracting conditions and in
particular the price, are not unreasonable.13 In theory, the safety net
could have adverse effects on competition. If a price cap would be
announced publically, it could become a focal point for retailers. The
regulator therefore does not disclose its assessment methodology.
Moreover, with a too strict safety net, the role of the retail competition
is hollowed out: price differences are reduced and consumers will no
longer search actively for new products.
This price surveillance process in the Netherlands should not be
confused with a full blown price cap regime, where maximum prices are
set according to strict rules. In its evaluation whether a contract is
reasonable, the regulator will not only take into account price levels but
also other contracting provisions, and innovative components that are
bundled with the energy product (for instance a tablet or an appliance).
It allows also for prices that are indexed on a price indicator according
some pre-defined formula. Note also that the safety net regulation does
not prohibit firms to provide freebies or signing bonuses, or to undercut
their own price. So firms can still compete on a day by day basis.
It is our understanding (from discussions with relevant parties) that
the threat of intervention is often sufficient to affect the price-setting
behaviour of retailers. According to the regulator, this safety net reg-
ulation results in lower prices for consumers. Over both 2016 and 2017,
the regulator reports that it has intervened in the tariff proposals twice
as the initial tariffs were assessed as unreasonable (ACM, 2016, 2017).
As a result of these two interventions, consumers’ aggregate bills
dropped with € 1 million in 2016 and € 5 million in 2017.
The third group of measures are information requirements. They often
have the form of voluntary codes of conducts (self-regulation) which
sometimes evolve into binding regulation upon ACM's endorsement of a
text agreed upon by stakeholders. Codes of conduct are meant to im-
prove market transparency (by making information more comparable),
but also to prevent abuses (telemarketing, door-to-door selling). The
third version of the Code of Conduct includes the provision that con-
sumers need to be precisely informed about the total annual costs of a
specific offer. This rule is based on general consumer legislation.
Finally, the regulator closely monitors the energy retail market and
publishes information to make the market more transparent. The reg-
ulator assesses on an ad-hoc basis the quality, in particular the in-
dependence and transparency, of the existing price-comparison web-
sites. In addition, the regulator provides information on the retail
energy market on a government website directed towards consumers.
At this site consumers can also submit complaints to the regulator.
Many countries have specific provisions for households with specific
needs (low income, less literate households). Those consumers might be
less savvy on average and therefore not benefit from competition as
much as other groups and they typically spend a larger fraction of their
income on energy services. This issue has received little public attention
in the Netherlands (compared to for instance in the UK). This is likely
due to the specific setting in the Netherlands. Social security provides
direct support to the most needy and poorer households receive rent
subsidies. Moreover, there were no large shocks in energy prices for
residential users, the safety net limited excessively priced contracts,
while the insulation standards for houses are relatively high.
4. Method and data
4.1. Method
We use several indicators to assess the development of Dutch retail
market. A first set of indicators are measures for industry structure.
Although the relationship between industry structure and competition
is not unambiguous, changes in the structure are informative about the
dynamics on the supply side. New firms can enter and lower market
concentration. At the same time, less efficient retailers are likely to lose
market share or to be taken over by competitors. We measure the
horizontal market structure by the HHI and the market shares of the
major players.
As indicator for dynamic efficiency, we use product and service
innovation, measured by the number of products offered to consumers.
Note that product variety is not necessarily a good measure of market
efficiency. Even in a market without entry barriers, variety might be too
Table 1
Regulatory events in the Dutch retail energy markets since 2004.
Category 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Structural Regulation (ex ante) Opening of the retail market Licensing of retailers
Full unbundling of retailers
Capacity tariff for distribution
New market model: retailers single point of contact
Roll-out of smart meters
Contracting Restrictions (ex-ante) Tariff surveillance (Safety Net)
Maximum penalty for early contract breach
Prohibition for automatic renewal of contracts (based on general consumer
legislation)
Obligation to offer a model contract
Information Requirements (ex-ante)
Guidelines on information provision (based on energy legislation)
Guidelines information provision (based on general consumer legislation)
Voluntary guidelines on composition of energy bill
Code of conduct retailers I
Code of conduct retailers II
Code of conduct retailers III
Code of conduct for smart meters
Monitoring (Ex-post) Assessment of price comparison websites
Sampling experience customer experience
Responses to complaints by retailers
13 This rather vague requirement that “contracts have to be reasonable” is
also what the law prescribes. Specific conditions for “being reasonable” are, on
purpose, not spelled out, as to provide sufficient discretion to the regulator. In
general the energy law says that a retail tariff is reasonable if the tariff is closely
related to the costs in the wholesale market plus a normal profit margin for the
retailer. It is up to discretion of the regulator to precisely determine the relevant
costs and profit margin as benchmark for assessing reasonability. The regulator
has not communicated publicly on how it evaluates prices.
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large or too small (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Moreover, an increase in
the number of products may also hinder competition if it reduces
market transparency and increases switching costs.
To analyse the pricing strategies of firms, we focus on a subset of
contracts – contracts with fixed and variable retail prices with a limited
duration of one year for both green and grey electricity. The variance
in retail prices across retailers also offers information about the degree
of competition (see Section 3). Large price differences may be a sign of
lack of transparency and difficulties for consumers to compare prices,
but it can also be related to consumer inertia (ACER/CEER, 2015). In
the case of homogeneous markets with search costs, the price spanned
by the lowest and the highest prices can be used as an indicator for the
intensity of competition. There is typically an inverse u-shaped re-
lationship between competition and price span. A lower price span
could indicate very intense competition but also tacit collusion. We
look, therefore, also at the evolution of the variance in retail prices over
time. Models with search cost and homogenous goods find that in
equilibrium, firms randomize prices, and that there is no clear price
leader that is always the cheapest (hence, there is some leap-frogging).
If a single firm is always the price leader, then this simple search model
does not hold, and there are (perceived) quality differences between
firms.
As indicator for the intensity of price competition we look at gross
retail margins. In a perfectly competitive market with homogenous
products, gross retail margins are equal to the marginal costs of re-
tailing, leaving no room for surplus profits. This is, however, no longer
the case if retailers have some market power, for instance because
products are (perceived as being) differentiated. We estimate the gross
margins in the Dutch retail energy market by comparing the retail
prices for a subset of product types with the relevant wholesale price.
We find the corresponding wholesale price by matching the duration of
the retail contract with the wholesale contract.14 Following Von der
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where ptr and ptw are the retail and wholesale price at month t, and ptr 1
the retail price in the previous month and t the error term. We assume
that marginal retail costs have not changed significantly. In a steady-
state situation ptr = ptr 1 = pr , and ignoring the error term, we are able








which means that in the long run the retail price consists of a constant














In addition, we analyse the symmetry in the pass-through of changes
in wholesale costs to the retail prices, as was done by others for some
other retail markets (see Section 3). Using the error-terms of the long-
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we estimate an error-correction model in order to determine how
changes in the wholesale price affect changes in the retail price. We
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where ptr is the first difference of the retail price, ptw is the first
difference of the wholesale price, LTt 1+ is the error term of the coin-
tegration equation if it has a positive value and LTt 1 error term of the
cointegration equation if it has a negative value. The hypothesis is that
the coefficients 2 and 3 are both negative. If LT t 1 is positive, the
actual retail price is above the long-term estimation and one may expect
that the price will go down. Otherwise, if LT t 1 is negative, the actual
retail is below the prediction based on the long-term estimation, and as
a result one may expect that the price will go up.15 If the upward and
downward effects of the wholesale price on the retail price are sym-
metric, then coefficients 2 and 3 should be equal.
Finally, we look at consumers’ behaviour. A first indicator is the
number of complaints filed by consumers at the Dutch Court of
Arbitration regarding energy retailers. As consumers become more sa-
tisfied with the functioning of the retail market, we expect this number
to decline. The second indicator is the switching rate, the yearly
number of consumers choosing a different retailer. There is no mono-
tonic relationship between switching rates and competition intensity as
in both a market with perfect competition (and hence equal prices) and
a market without any competition (i.e. a monopolistic market), con-
sumers will never switch. In combination with information about price
differences, it may give some insight into the search intensity of con-
sumers.
4.2. Data
The analysis relies mainly on a dataset on the retail energy market
collected by the Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM), which
contains monthly prices for all products offered in the Dutch retail
electricity markets over the period 2008–2014. In addition we use data
from other Dutch agencies (Dutch Court of Arbitration, CertiQ and
Vectis), Bloomberg (for wholesale electricity prices), and other policy
reports (Market Response, 2014; Mulder, 2015; several monitoring re-
ports by the ACM).
The main retail data set contains 11.000 observations of new price -
product combinations offered by the 32 retailers that operated in the
Dutch market over the sample period (Jan 2008-Dec 2014). For this
study, we limit ourselves to electricity contracts offered to households.
Hence, we do not look at interaction with the retail gas market16 and
neglect contracts for smaller industrial or commercial consumers.
This data set does not contain information when specific contracts
are withdrawn from the retail market. We therefore assume that each
price-contract combination will remain available on the retail market
for six months, unless it is being replaced at an earlier moment by an
identical product offered by the same retailer at a different price level.
Across time, products are assumed to be identical, if they are sold under
the same (commercial) name or, if almost all contract specifications are
identical and for a window of ca. 3 months before and after the newer
contract, no closer match exists.17 Contracts are mainly classified by
14 For 1-year fixed price contracts, the relevant wholesale price is the 1-year
forward price at the time the retail product is sold. As retailers generally update
the prices in their variable-price contracts every quarter, we assume that the
relevant wholesale price for these contracts is the 1-quarter forward price.
15 Because in that case, LTt is negative, a negative coefficient is required to
obtain a positive effect on the retail price.
16 Most retailers offer dual fuel contracts. However, the conditions (price,
type of product) for the electricity product are not fundamentally different from
single fuel electricity contracts. In contrast to the UK market, dual fuel contracts
already existed before the liberalization, and there is no incumbent gas retailer,
that acted as a new entrant in the electricity retail market.
17 Commercial product names might change every few years for what are
essentially identical products. When we build our time series we try to follow
products across those name changes. Even if a new commercial product is in-
troduced, old commercial products might be phased out only gradually (e.g. by
being available only for existing customers). In that case we use the price of the
newly introduced product. Contract prices are often adjusted at regular inter-
vals, which allows us to match different contracts more easily over time.
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contract duration, pricing flexibility (fixed of variable), primary fuel,
and sales channel. Sometimes those specifications are insufficient to
uniquely determine a specific contract and in these cases individual
contract specifications are checked on the websites of retailers. This
data is codified to construct a multi-dimensional panel data (time, re-
tailer, and contract type). Given the frequency of adjustment, we use a
monthly resolution for the time variable. Note that the contract types
themselves could be considered as multi-dimensional variables de-
scribing contract duration, pricing flexibility, primary fuel etc. Almost
all contracts are sold nationwide with a uniform price, so delivery lo-
cation is not a differentiating factor.
The pricing of retail contracts generally are non-linear and consist of
a yearly fixed term f (in EUR / Yr.) and a variable energy component v
(in EUR/MWh).18 In order to make contracts comparable, we calculate
the average electricity price (EUR/MWh) for an average household that




The importance of the fixed component f in the electricity price has
increased over time from ca. 20 EUR/Yr. to ca. 35 EUR/Yr. The fixed
component increased for all retailers, and is about 10% of the overall
bill.19
In order to compare prices across retailers, for each retailer four
composite benchmark products are created: a fixed 1 year green con-
tract, a fixed 1 year grey contract, a variable green contract and a
variable grey contract.20 For the composite benchmark product, we
neglect contracts representing short duration offers, and contracts that
are not available to all consumers or specific promotions.21 If a retailer
offers contracts with similar specifications at a given moment in time,
but with pricing formulas targeting households with different con-
sumption volume (by offering a menu of contracts with different fixed
and variable pricing components), the cheapest contract for a yearly
consumption of 3.2MWh is considered.22 For the variable-price con-
tracts, we combine contracts with an unlimited duration (which can be
cancelled at no costs) and contracts of one-year duration (which may
require a cancellation fee when contracts were finished before the end
of the contract).23 As the composite price for the green products, we
take the cheapest available contract for green electricity for each re-
tailer. By selecting the cheapest contract, which is often based on
Nordic hydropower, contracts become more comparable.24
From our database, we cannot observe the actual prices that con-
sumers pay, as there are often promotional offers, and many promotions
are not fully registered in the database. Those promotions could take
the form of an upfront switching bonus, an introductory price for a
limited duration, or a loyalty price (where prices decrease over time),
and often depend on the sales channel (e.g. door-to-door, comparison
website, own website, in a physical shop).
In order to estimate the retail margins, we use two benchmark
products for wholesale electricity prices. For the variable-price con-
tracts we take a quarterly forward contract, since retailers usually up-
date these prices every 3 months. For the 1-year fixed-price retail
contracts, we take the 1-year forward contract.25 Forward contracts are
traded on a daily basis and might fluctuate considerably from day to
day given limited liquidity on some days. We therefore use the average
closing price during a ten-day window around the first day of the
month. Since retail prices have to be submitted to the regulator for
assessment one month before the energy is delivered to consumers, they
can only be based on market information that is at least one month old.
We therefore compare retail price with wholesale prices that are lagged
one month.26
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Market structure
The Dutch retail market remains fairly concentrated in spite of a
number of entrants. With an HHI concentration index of 2200, it is
more concentrated than the Dutch wholesale electricity market (Fig. 1).
Several retail companies use multiple-brand strategies. For instance
Oxxio, which started as an entrant, is now a one of ENECO's brands,27
while Essent/RWE owns a second brand, EnergieDirect, which sells
only through internet. Also GreenChoice belongs to the ENECO group
(See Fig. 2). All major brands are active in all regions, and retail
competition is national in scale.
The three largest retailers, the incumbents Essent, Nuon, and Eneco
with their affiliated brands, serve about 80% of the market. Essent and
Nuon were privatized and acquired in 2009 by RWE (Germany) and
Vattenfall (Sweden), respectively. Some retailers are vertically in-
tegrated: RWE and Vattenfall are major international players in the
wholesale market, but Eneco owns only limited production capacity. As
it was not yet fully unbundled, it provided retail as well as distribution
services through the network company Stedin.28 Although Engie and
18 Only a small fraction of consumers opts for “Time-of-Use” pricing (which
requires a special meter, and has a different price setting at night and day). We
therefore neglect those types of contracts.
19 If only some retailers would adjust their tariff structure, then this could
indicate market segmentation: Some retailers focus on large households, while
others focus on the smaller ones. As all retailers are adjusting their tariffs, those
adjustments probably reflect a better alignment of the fixed tariff with the per
household fixed cost (billing, communication, and average debt collection).
Electricity is, until now, almost never used for heating or cooking purposes, so
demand across households does not vary as much as in some other countries,
and segmentation might therefore be less valuable.
20 In the variable-price contracts, generally the prices are adapted every
quarter or half year. As a result, this type of contracts can also be called fixed
quarter or half-year contracts.
21 We discard for instance contracts offered to consumer collectives, special
prices offered to retention consumers, contracts with best-price guarantees,
transitional contracts during mergers, contracts with additional services or
applications (like smart meters), and any exotic pricing formulas (only de-
creasing, temperature dependent, wind speed dependent, a mixture of fixed and
flexible), or targeting specific users (for charging electric cars). By neglecting
some contracts, we might underestimate the level of price competition, so our
results are conservative. Sales to consumers’ collectives were observed in some
years and for a few retailers, at prices close to the other contracts offered by that
retailer.
22 Few firms offer multiple pricing formulas: One incumbent firm offered two
additional tariffs for variable price contracts for a duration of 10 years. The
additional contracts are optimal for consumption levels below ca. 1.5MWh/
Year and above 6.5 MWh/Year. Another incumbent firm offered in 2010 three
additional tariffs for fixed priced green electricity for a duration up to 1.5 years.
23 One-year contracts with variable price form only a small fraction of this
group. Most contracts with variable prices have an unlimited duration. Note
that a contract with variable prices and a fixed duration may be attractive to
consumers because of a relative low initial price, but after the contract has been
signed the retailer has the option to raise the price, making the contract less
attractive ex-post.
24 Retailers typically offer a vertically differentiated set of green contracts
ranging from Nordic hydro (the cheapest), to European Wind, and Dutch wind
energy (the most expensive).
25 For both wholesale prices, we use OTC prices. Differences between the OTC
price and the exchange price are negligible for the period under consideration.
26 Although retailers may also make some costs for acquiring Green
Certificates of Origin, there is no publicly available information on these prices.
27 Eneco is one of the incumbent energy suppliers, until recently vertically
integrated with the network company Stedin. Eneco used to be owned by the
municipalities and regions (Provinces), but recently these shareholders have
decided to sell their shares.
28 Eneco unbundled in 2017 after a long process in which it (unsuccessfully)
appealed the legislation imposing unbundling.
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E.ON are large international energy firms, they focus in the Netherlands
only on production, and have small retail market shares. One relatively
successful entrant, Nederlandse Energiemaatschappij (NEM) still has
low market shares, while other entrants have been (partially) acquired
by one of the incumbents (Oxxio, Greenchoice).
5.2. Innovation in products
Since the opening of the Dutch retail energy market both green
(100% from renewable energy sources) and grey electricity (from a
mixture of energy sources) are offered. The number of product types
has strongly increased (Fig. 3). Currently, consumers can choose among
ca. 50 green and 20 grey products offered by the 7 main brands. Hence,
on average each brand offers 10 different products. Product prolifera-
tion is driven by two developments: quality differentiation in green
electricity and innovation in contracting forms.
Retailers have to provide a label detailing the origin of their elec-
tricity by relying on Certificates of Origins (CoO), which is a European-
wide tradeable certification system for electricity production. Retailers
can bundle CoOs with wholesale electricity to construct green retail
contracts (100% from renewable energy sources) and grey electricity
(from a mixture of energy sources). The market share of green elec-
tricity has increased significantly. In 2014, about two thirds of elec-
tricity supplied to residential households was green, while in 2008 this
share was less than one third (ACM, 2014). For green products, Dutch
retailers depend strongly on the import of CoOs from for instance
Norway.29
From around 2011, green electricity becomes a quality-differ-
entiated product with plain green electricity (based mainly on Nordic
hydro-electricity), and premium products such as European wind,
Dutch wind or Dutch solar. Consumers are prepared to pay a premium
for those higher quality products. Several action committees organized
information campaigns about differences in green electricity and tried
for instance to shame (local) governments into buying ‘more honest
(Dutch) green electricity’.30 This increased product differentiation is
likely to affect competition, as it is linked to specific the location and
technologies of production plants and can therefore not be readily
copied by other retailers.31 Fig. 4 shows the number of major brands
offering different quality levels of green and grey electricity products.
Another dimension of product differentiation is pricing structure. Two
pricing structures are offered by all brands: variable price contracts and
fixed price contracts. Variable-price contracts are very similar to the pre-
liberalization types of contracts where prices are adjusted on a regular 3–6
months schedule. The variable prices are not explicitly indexed on
wholesale spot market prices, but are set by the retailer (although still
subject to the Safety Net regulation).32 With fixed-price contracts, house-
holds pay a fixed electricity price for a specific duration (typically 1 or 3
years). Contracts with an undetermined duration always use variable
prices. If consumers do not undertake any action before the end of a con-
tracting period, the contract is automatically transformed into a variable
price contract. Other novel types of pricing structures are introduced by a
subset of brands (Fig. 5). Those contracts are often part of large marketing
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Fig. 1. HHI of Dutch electricity wholesale and retail market, 2006–2014.
Source: ACM
Fig. 2. Market shares in Dutch electricity market: retail and wholesale 2013.
Sources: Retail data: Market Response (2014), Wholesale data (Mulder, 2015)
Fig. 3. Number of products offered by the 7 main brands, by type (Green/
Grey), 2008–2014.
Source: ACM
29 About one third of national electricity consumption (industry and retail) is
green, while only 10% of national electricity production is green (CertiQ,
2015). The Netherlands belongs to a small group of countries which dominate
the demand for guarantees of origin in Europe. Other countries which also
consume a lot of renewable energy through these certificates are Belgium,
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Italy (BEUC, 2016).
30 Since 2013, national newspapers report regularly on the issue of tampered
green power, or “sjoemelstroom”.
31 Product differentiation puts a premium on Dutch green electricity and wind
& solar electricity. Producers with a large Dutch fossil fuel park (Essent, Nuon),
and with Nordic Hydro power plants (Vattenfall), might find it difficult to offer
those products. Note that, unlike some other countries, German regulation re-
stricts the use of Certificates of Origin if companies receive German subsidies.
Hence, German wind does not provide competitive pressure in the Netherlands.
32 Contracts which are indexed on the spot market have been more popular in
Norway. Norway is however a hydro based system, and in the short to medium
run wholesale prices are more stable than in the Netherlands. This could ex-
plain why those contracts did become more popular.
33 One typical contract is an option contract in which prices are variable but
cannot increase above their initial price. Hence, those contracts include an
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In some countries electricity retailers differentiate prices based on
consumer location, consumption volume and payment mechanism, but
not in the Netherlands. Regional price discrimination is not very
common and if it is used, then it is part of targeted local marketing
efforts (e.g. door-to-door campaign) and prices are not posted pub-
lically. A few retailers offer volume differentiated contracts for one or
two products. There is almost no price differentiation according to
payment system. Direct-debit consumers receive a reduction of 1 or 2
EUR on their monthly bill, and pre-paid contracts are almost non-ex-
istent. More recently, retailers start bundling energy contracts with
other services or devices (smart thermostats, tablets, energy audits,
insulation, etc.).
5.3. Price comparison websites
Since the start of the liberalization comparison websites have played
an important role in the retail energy market.34 However, as products
have become more numerous and more complex and as door-to-door
selling and tele marketing are no longer as effective, comparison
websites have become crucial for consumers to make well-informed
decisions, and for retailers’ overall strategies.35
Although all comparison websites are commercial entities, different
market models are used. A large number of comparison websites are
paid by the retailer for every consumer that signs up to a new con-
tract.36 Advertisement driven comparison websites do not have com-
mercial links with the retailers, but generate revenue by the publicity
on their websites and collect information of retailers themselves. As
they do not have commercial links with retailers, they do not offer
special deals.
In order to facilitate the retail market, comparison sites should not
treat some of retailers preferentially and offer a sufficiently wide
variety of products. A retailer could receive preferential treatment if
certain contracts of competing retailers are not offered. Early on ACM
would monitor whether all official products were offered on the com-
parison site, while neglecting the special deal contracts. However, as
the total number of contracts has increased, and the number of special
deals in particular, this was no longer feasible. ACM therefore (irre-
gularly) monitors the contractual relations between retailers and com-
parison sites and looks at overall product variety.
The focus of comparison websites has shifted from providing price
information on standardized products, to providing additional in-
formation on product types, the quality of retailers, and special con-
tracting conditions. Most comparison sites provide correct information
on the different pricing components and the yearly bill for customers.
On some of the other dimensions, such as the specific conditions for
special deals, transparency is lacking.37 Responsibility for providing
this information is often shared between the retailer and the compar-
ison site.
5.4. Pricing strategies and price dispersion
Our data shows that retailers use different pricing strategies. The
frequency of price adjustments differs across firms. Some retailers
Fig. 4. Number of brands offering green products (Largest 7 Brands), 2008 vs. 2013.
Source: ACM
Fig. 5. Number of brands offering different contracting types (Largest 7
Brands), 2008 vs. 2013.
Source: ACM
(footnote continued)
explicit price cap. Other contracts that affect household's risk are also offered: a
linear combination of a fixed and variable price contract (which in effect
dampens price fluctuations), prices that drop with outside temperature (and
hedge against cold winters) or with higher wind speeds (which hedges the re-
tailer, as it only offers low retail prices when wholesale prices are low). In fact,
the last two contracts are the only ones which explicitly link the retail price to
the wholesale market conditions. The contract indexed on the outside tem-
perature hedges the volume risks during colder winter months (and thus leads
to negative correlation between the wholesale and the retail price).
34 This section is based on monitoring reports frequently published by the
energy regulator (DTe/NMa 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2011; ACM
(2014 and 2015).
35 In the press door-to-door sales of energy products received bad publicity. In
October 2009 a strict telemarketing law with an opt-out rule was introduced in
the Netherlands, Stb. 2009, 129.
36 Typically those websites provide a direct link to the product on the website
of the retailer, or they allow consumers to contract directly through their own
website interface. The sites have a contractual relationship with one or several
retailers, and are therefore able to provide special deals that are not present on
the retailers’ website. The most prominent special deals are cash-back offers
(e.g. lump-sum payments up to 200 EUR) or reduced rates for an introductory
period.
37 Sometimes cash backs will only be paid out if the consumer would stay
longer than the contract duration. Once the promotion is finished, consumers
might end up with a higher priced “sleepers’ contract”.
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frequently introduce new prices, while others maintain their prices for a
longer period of time (Fig. 6). This holds for variable and fixed price
contracts and for green and grey products. We also see that firms often
undercut each other, and that there is no clear first mover. For the fixed
price contracts, several firms have the cheapest offer for short periods,
so there is also no consistent price leader.
Overall price dispersion appears rather constant over time, although
there is a slight decline for grey fixed price contracts. The difference
between the lowest and highest priced contract for green electricity was
about 15 euro/MWh in 2014. For grey electricity this difference is much
smaller. Measuring price dispersion by the standard deviation and the
difference between the highest and lowest price, we find that price
dispersion has declined strongly for fixed-price products, both green
and grey (Fig. 7). For variable-price products, however, the price dis-
persion did not structurally change.38 The initial level of the standard
deviation for fixed-price contracts was relatively high, in particular for
grey products. In 2014, the price dispersion for both types of products
was fairly similar.
5.5. Retail margins
Retail prices have declined over the past years, but this also holds to
some extent for the wholesale prices (Fig. 8). In order to determine how
the retail margins have developed, we conduct a time-series regression
analysis as described in Section 4.39 Both the 1-year fixed average retail
price as well as the yearly forward wholesale price are cointegrated
non-stationary series (see Appendix A).40 This allows us to include the
levels of these prices in the regression equation. We conduct this ana-
lysis for the group of all 1-year fixed products over the period
2009–2014 as well as for the subgroups of green and grey products, and
all products in two different sub-periods (Table 2).
We find that the ratio between the retail price and the wholesale
price is about 1.5, which means that the gross mark-up for retailers is on
average around 50% (Table 3). The mark-up is higher for green than for
grey products and has decreased over time. Given an average annual
consumption of 3.5 MWh, the yearly gross margin is about 90 EUR per
household over the full sample.41 It is less for grey than for green
products (Columns 2 and 3), and has decreased over time (Columns 4
and 5). Extrapolating the time trend of Table 3, we find that the savings
for the average household are about 3 EUR per year on a total elec-
tricity bill of about 260 EUR. Of course, on individual level these
benefits may be much larger.
5.6. Pass-through of wholesale costs
The previous analysis shows a significant long-term relation be-
tween the 1-year fixed retail price and 1-year forward wholesale price.
We now look at short term dynamics. Monthly changes in the retail
price are positively related with changes in the wholesale price, but this
effect is not significant (Table 4). Deviations from the long-term price
relationship affect the retail price. Both coefficients of the error term
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Fig. 6. Price deviations from average price, by product type and month, 2008–2014.
Source: ACM; own calculations
38 When we regress the price dispersion on a trend variable, then the trend
coefficient is negative and significant at a 1% level for the fixed retail prices,
but highly insignificant for the variable retail prices.
39 Besides the wholesale costs of the electricity, retailers also need to make
some costs for acquiring green certificates. The price of these certificates appear
to be only a few eurocents/MWh, except for specific types of green certificates,
such as Dutch wind, which prices may be a few euro/MWh.
40 The series for the variable retail prices and the quarterly forward prices,
however, are not cointegrated.
41 The gross margin is used to cover the costs of administration, marketing,
and price and credit risks. The remainder is the net margin, i.e. the retailer's
profits.
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joint effect is statistically significant as well. However, we do not find
evidence of asymmetric pass-through of wholesale costs, as we reject
the hypothesis that the coefficients for the positive and negative re-
siduals are different.
5.7. Consumers
Consumers have become more satisfied with the energy retail
market at least as reflected in the strong decline in the number of
complaints at the Dutch Court of Arbitration (Fig. 9). Immediately after
the full opening of the retail market in 2004, the number of complaints
rose sharply to more than 3000 in 2005. These complaints were mostly
related to problems with the switching process (NMa, 2008). Triggered
by these complaints new measures on information provision were
introduced (guidelines, code of conduct as shown in Table 1).
Annual switching rate increased gradually from about 5% per year
to almost 14% in 2014 (see Fig. 10). Compared to Dutch health-care
insurance market (which was liberalized in 2006), energy consumers
are fairly active. The degree of switching in the Dutch retail energy
market is higher than in several other European countries, but lower
than in the UK, Australia and New Zeeland (VAASA/ETT, 2012; ACER/
CEER, 2015). Although the annual switching rate has increased, a sig-
nificant amount of households (40%) has never switched supplier
(ACM, 2015).
6. Conclusions and policy implications
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Fig. 7. Price dispersion: standard deviation of prices across firms, by product type, 2008–2014.





















































Fig. 8. Average retail price versus relevant wholesale price, by product type, 2008–2014.
Source: retail prices: ACM; wholesale prices: Bloomberg
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retail market has matured: the market has become transparent while
consumers can switch more easily from supplier and product. Switching
rates are among the highest in Europe and continue to increase. The
number of complaints is back to pre-liberalization levels, from which
we conclude that consumer confidence has increased. Product innova-
tion is strong, in particular for green energy. As retailers spend much
efforts in explaining the essential product characteristics, comparison
websites have improved information provision, and consumers are
willing to pay a premium for green electricity, new products are likely
to correspond to the tastes of marginal consumers. Innovation is
therefore likely to have positive welfare effects, for a substantial frac-
tion of active (and thus marginal) households, although we cannot rule
out that it harmed inactive consumer who did not fully experience the
benefits of competition. Gross retail margins have decreased slightly,
although this monetary benefit is estimated at only a few euros per
household per year.
Market concentration remains fairly high with the three largest re-
tailers having 80% market share and one surviving entrant with a
market share above 5%. A large fraction of consumers never switched
supplier and remained “dormant”, as in many other European markets.
Dormant consumers remain on default offers, which are variable price
contracts. Those contracts are more expensive than other contracts in
the market, in spite of price supervision. The Dutch regulator surveys
all new retail prices before market introduction in order to prevent too
high retail prices. Although there has been a debate to phase out this
regulation (IEA, 2014), it is still in place and operational: the regulator
still intervenes a few times each year.
Many active consumers switched to green energy products. Gross
retail margins are higher for green electricity, although the additional
production costs are small, and price dispersion has increased for green
products.42 This indicates that the green retail market is less competi-
tive and retailers are able to capture the higher willingness-to-pay of
consumers for green products (as in OECD, 2014).
Experiences in the Dutch retail market differ from those in other
countries. As there is no incumbent gas retailer in the Netherlands, dual
fuel contracts were not a driver of competition as in the UK. Although
incumbent retailers started as regional monopolies, regional price dis-
crimination was never an issue and retail competition is national. This
might be due to the relatively homogenous Dutch marketing landscape.
In the Netherlands, competition seems to be based on product in-
novation (as suggested by Joskow, 2000) and not on prices as in
Norway. This may be caused by differences in technology and market
concentration. Almost all Norwegian electricity is based on green
Norwegian hydro, there is thus less room for product differentiation.
Table 2
Retail price-regression for fixed- price contracts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Period 09–14 09–14 09–14 09–11 12–14
Green/Grey Both Green Grey Both Both
Lag Retail Price 0.853*** 0.799*** 0.754*** 0.784*** 0.732***
(0.0139) (0.0215) (0.0292) (0.0260) (0.0301)
Wholesale Price 0.179*** 0.216*** 0.198*** 0.230*** 0.170***
(0.0240) (0.0303) (0.0387) (0.0440) (0.0303)
Constant 2.069 4.605*** 8.307*** 4.878 11.45***
(1.335) (1.748) (2.489) (3.029) (1.832)
# Observations 725 444 281 338 387
R-squared 0.818 0.752 0.746 0.758
# Products 12 7 5 12 11
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; with
fixed effects.
Table 3
Retail margins by contract type for different periods (Fixed price contracts).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Period 09–14 09–14 09–14 09–11 12–14
Green / Grey Both Green Grey Both Both
Fixed mark-up (€) 14 21 34 23 42
Pass-through ratio 1.22 1.07 0.80 1.07 0.64
Retail-wholesale price ratio 1.49 1.51 1.45 1.50 1.46
Gross margin (€/household/year) 89 94 82 91 83
Table 4
Error-correction regression to test asymmetric pass-through of 1-year for-
ward wholesale prices to 1-year fixed retail prices.
Diff. retail price Coefficient
Diff. wholesale price 0.0496 (0.0445)
residual +(t−1) −0.142*** (0.0503)




Wald test on residuals of long-term relation (p-value)
- joint significance 0.00
- different in size 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Fig. 9. Number of complaints of consumers regarding retail energy market.
Source: Dutch Court of Arbitration (annual reports)
Fig. 10. Annual percentage of switching consumers in energy and health care.
Source: ACM, Vectis
42 Given the subsidies for green electricity, the price of Certificates of Origins
is relatively small.
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The Norwegian electricity market is much less concentrated, which
could make national marketing campaigns for new products less ef-
fective. The gross retail margin is considerably higher in the Nether-
lands than in Norway. This might indicate softer (price) competition in
the Dutch retail market, but could also be related to differences in non-
energy related retail costs.
Hence, although there are many parallel developments across retail
markets, the effectiveness of behavioural and structural regulatory
measure depends also on regional and cultural differences and are path
dependent.
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